Any firm with market power seeks to maximize profits
Wants to (1st) create a surplus
Any firm with market power seeks to maximize profits
Wants to (1st) create a surplus and then appropriate some of it as profit
Consumers are still better off than without the firm because it creates value (consumer surplus)
William Nordhaus
(1941-)
Economics Nobel 2018
“We conclude that [about 2.2%] of the social returns from technological advances over the 1948-2001 period was captured by producers, indicating that most of the benefits of technological change are passed on to consumers rather than captured by producers,” (p.1)
Nordhaus, William, 2004, "Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and Measurement," NBER Working Paper 10433
The most obvious way to capture more surplus is to raise prices
Also, we saw that if a firm wants to sell more units, it has to lower the price on all units!
Instead, if firm could charge different customers with different WTP different prices for the same goods, firm could convert more consumer surplus into profit
“Price discrimination” or “Variable pricing”
1) Firm must have market power
1) Firm must have market power
2) Firms must be able to prevent resale or arbitrage
Firm must acquire information about the variations in its customers' demands
Can the firm identify consumers' demands before they buy the product?
(Goolsbee et al., 2013: 397)
With perfect information ⟹ Perfect or 1st-degree price discrimination
Charge a different price to each customer (their max WTP)
With imperfect information ⟹ 3rd-degree price discrimination
Separate customers into groups (by demand differences) and charge each group a different price
If firm has perfect information about every customer's demand before purchase:
Perfect or 1st-degree price discrimination: firm charges each customer their maximum willingness to pay
Firm converts all consumer surplus into profit!
Produces the competitive amount (qc)!
Firms almost never have perfect information about their customers
But they can often separate customers by observable characteristics into different groups with similar demands before purchasing
Firms segment the market or engage in 3rd-degree price discrimination by charging different prices to different groups of customers
By far the most common type of price-discrimination
Business Travelers (Less Elastic)
Vacationers (More Elastic)
Consider airlines: different groups of travelers have different demands & price elasticities
Business Travelers (Less Elastic)
Vacationers (More Elastic)
The firm could charge a single price to all travelers and earn some profit
Business Travelers (Less Elastic)
Vacationers (More Elastic)
With different prices: raise price on inelastic travelers, lower price on elastic travelers, earn more profit!
Price-inelastic buyers will buy something (a necessity?) now regardless of whether or not it is “on sale”
Price-elastic buyers will be attracted to buying something when price is lower
Stores lower prices on rare occasions to attract price-sensitive shoppers (will lose profits on price-insensitive shoppers who buy during the sale!)
Coupons also are designed to bring in more price-elastic shoppers
Store sells at higher price (to capture profit from price-insensitive shoppers who can’t be bothered with coupons) and brings in profits from price-sensitive shoppers who use coupons to pay lower price
How much should each segment be charged?
Firm treats each segment as a different market
Lerner index implies optimal markup for each segment, again: p−MC(q)pMarkup % of Price=−1ϵ
Example: Suppose you run a bar in downtown Frederick, and estimate the nightly demands for beer from undergraduates (U) and graduates (G) to be:
qU=18−4pUqG=12−pG
Assume the only cost of producing a beer is a constant marginal (and average) cost of $2.
If your bar had to charge a uniform price for beer, how much profit would the bar earn?
If you could price discriminate, how much profit would the bar earn?
By customer characteristics
Past purchase behavior
By location
Ideal competitive market, qc where pc=MC
A pure monopolist would produce less qm at higher pm
Transfer of some surplus from consumers to producers
A price-discriminating monopolist transfers MORE surplus from consumers to producers
But encourages monopolist to produce more than the pure monopoly level and reduce deadweight loss!
Price-discrimination creates incentives for innovation and risk-taking
Firms with high fixed costs of investment earn greater profits with price discrimination, can recover their fixed costs
Might not invest or produce if they had to charge a uniform price
As with markups in general, price discrimination has everything to do with price elasticity of demand
If you are paying too much and losing consumer surplus, the real “problem” is that your demand is not very elastic
If you want to pay less, buy generic (more elastic)
Realize that any “sales” and “discounts” are calculated to make the store more money
You can also be better off as a consumer too
Think about your consumer surplus!
If you were already planning to buy the product, a fall in price is a good deal for you
If you weren’t going to buy the product before, and now you do, the sale was effective for the store, and you likely don’t get much surplus
Price discrimination is selling identical goods to people at different prices
But not everytime people pay different prices means it is price discrimination
Sometimes it is truly different goods that people are paying different prices for
Example: bottled sparkling water often higher price than Coca Cola
Could be because sparkling water drinkers have less elastic demand than Coke drinkers
Or could be that it is more expensive to package sparkling water (economies of scale with greater number of Coke drinkers)
The best way to tell the difference is to see what happens if demand changes price elasticity (and costs do not change)
See today’s class notes for a graphical demonstration
If firm cannot identify customers' demands or types before purchase
Indirect or 2nd-degree price discrimination: firm offers difference price-quantity bundles and allows customers self-select (based on preferences)
Block Pricing/Nonlinear pricing: offer different prices for different quantities that consumers can choose
quantity discounting: higher quantities offered at lower prices
Example: instead of one profit-maximizing monopoly price of pm for qm units, offer:
Converts DWL into CS and captures more of it as Profit
Versioning: offer different prices for different qualities of a good (instead of quantity)
Must make versions incentive-compatible so that each type of consumer chooses version that matches their preferences
“It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a roof over the third-class carriage or to upholster the third-class seats that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches ... What the company is trying to do is prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from traveling third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich ... And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proved almost cruel to the third-class passengers and mean to the second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class customers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous.” — Jules Dupuit
Firms often tie multiple goods together, where you must buy both goods in order to consume the product
This is actually a method of intertemporal price-discrimination!
Companies often sell printers at marginal cost (no markup) and sell the ink/refills at a much higher markup
Reduce arbitrage:
High-volume users: buy more ink over time; pay more per sheet printed
Low-volume users: buy less ink; pay less per sheet printed
Again, a tradeoff:
Increased profits and reduced consumer surplus, reduced deadweight loss
Spreads fixed cost of research & development over more users
If printers & ink were not tied:
High-volume users would keep buying ink and save money (vs. tied)
Low-volume users might not buy the (now expensive) printer at all!
Firms often bundle products together as a single package, and refuse to offer individual parts of the package
Often, consumers do not want all products in the bundle
Or, if they were able to buy just part of the bundle, they would not buy the other parts
Example: Consider two consumers, each have different reservation prices to buy components in Microsoft Office bundle
Amy's WTP | Ben's WTP | |
---|---|---|
MS Word | $70 | $40 |
MS Excel | $50 | $60 |
Example: Consider two consumers, each have different reservation prices to buy components in Microsoft Office bundle
Amy's WTP | Ben's WTP | |
---|---|---|
MS Word | $70 | $40 |
MS Excel | $50 | $60 |
Microsoft could charge separate prices for MS Word and MS Excel
MS Word: both would buy at $40, generating $80 of revenues
Example: Consider two consumers, each have different reservation prices to buy components in Microsoft Office bundle
Amy's WTP | Ben's WTP | |
---|---|---|
MS Word | $70 | $40 |
MS Excel | $50 | $60 |
Microsoft could charge separate prices for MS Word and MS Excel
MS Word: both would buy at $40, generating $80 of revenues
MS Excel: both would buy at $50, generating $100 of revenues
Example: Consider two consumers, each have different reservation prices to buy components in Microsoft Office bundle
Amy's WTP | Ben's WTP | |
---|---|---|
MS Word | $70 | $40 |
MS Excel | $50 | $60 |
Microsoft could charge separate prices for MS Word and MS Excel
MS Word: both would buy at $40, generating $80 of revenues
MS Excel: both would buy at $50, generating $100 of revenues
Total revenues of individual sales: $180
Example: Consider two consumers, each have different reservation prices to buy components in Microsoft Office bundle
Amy's WTP | Ben's WTP | |
---|---|---|
MS Word | $70 | $40 |
MS Excel | $50 | $60 |
Bundle | $120 | $100 |
Microsoft could charge separate prices for MS Word and MS Excel
MS Word: both would buy at $40, generating $80 of revenues
MS Excel: both would buy at $50, generating $100 of revenues
Total revenues of individual sales: $180
Microsoft can instead add their individual reservation prices and bundle products together to force both consumers to buy both products
Bundle: both buy at $100, generating $200 revenue
Again, a tradeoff:
Increased profits and reduced consumer surplus, reduced deadweight loss
Spreads fixed cost of research & development over more users
Goods with high fixed costs and low marginal costs (software, TV, music) increase profits from bundling
Keyboard shortcuts
↑, ←, Pg Up, k | Go to previous slide |
↓, →, Pg Dn, Space, j | Go to next slide |
Home | Go to first slide |
End | Go to last slide |
Number + Return | Go to specific slide |
b / m / f | Toggle blackout / mirrored / fullscreen mode |
c | Clone slideshow |
p | Toggle presenter mode |
t | Restart the presentation timer |
?, h | Toggle this help |
o | Tile View: Overview of Slides |
Esc | Back to slideshow |
Any firm with market power seeks to maximize profits
Wants to (1st) create a surplus
Any firm with market power seeks to maximize profits
Wants to (1st) create a surplus and then appropriate some of it as profit
Consumers are still better off than without the firm because it creates value (consumer surplus)
William Nordhaus
(1941-)
Economics Nobel 2018
“We conclude that [about 2.2%] of the social returns from technological advances over the 1948-2001 period was captured by producers, indicating that most of the benefits of technological change are passed on to consumers rather than captured by producers,” (p.1)
Nordhaus, William, 2004, "Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and Measurement," NBER Working Paper 10433
The most obvious way to capture more surplus is to raise prices
Also, we saw that if a firm wants to sell more units, it has to lower the price on all units!
Instead, if firm could charge different customers with different WTP different prices for the same goods, firm could convert more consumer surplus into profit
“Price discrimination” or “Variable pricing”
1) Firm must have market power
1) Firm must have market power
2) Firms must be able to prevent resale or arbitrage
Firm must acquire information about the variations in its customers' demands
Can the firm identify consumers' demands before they buy the product?
(Goolsbee et al., 2013: 397)
With perfect information ⟹ Perfect or 1st-degree price discrimination
Charge a different price to each customer (their max WTP)
With imperfect information ⟹ 3rd-degree price discrimination
Separate customers into groups (by demand differences) and charge each group a different price
If firm has perfect information about every customer's demand before purchase:
Perfect or 1st-degree price discrimination: firm charges each customer their maximum willingness to pay
Firm converts all consumer surplus into profit!
Produces the competitive amount (qc)!
Firms almost never have perfect information about their customers
But they can often separate customers by observable characteristics into different groups with similar demands before purchasing
Firms segment the market or engage in 3rd-degree price discrimination by charging different prices to different groups of customers
By far the most common type of price-discrimination
Business Travelers (Less Elastic)
Vacationers (More Elastic)
Consider airlines: different groups of travelers have different demands & price elasticities
Business Travelers (Less Elastic)
Vacationers (More Elastic)
The firm could charge a single price to all travelers and earn some profit
Business Travelers (Less Elastic)
Vacationers (More Elastic)
With different prices: raise price on inelastic travelers, lower price on elastic travelers, earn more profit!
Price-inelastic buyers will buy something (a necessity?) now regardless of whether or not it is “on sale”
Price-elastic buyers will be attracted to buying something when price is lower
Stores lower prices on rare occasions to attract price-sensitive shoppers (will lose profits on price-insensitive shoppers who buy during the sale!)
Coupons also are designed to bring in more price-elastic shoppers
Store sells at higher price (to capture profit from price-insensitive shoppers who can’t be bothered with coupons) and brings in profits from price-sensitive shoppers who use coupons to pay lower price
How much should each segment be charged?
Firm treats each segment as a different market
Lerner index implies optimal markup for each segment, again: p−MC(q)pMarkup % of Price=−1ϵ
Example: Suppose you run a bar in downtown Frederick, and estimate the nightly demands for beer from undergraduates (U) and graduates (G) to be:
qU=18−4pUqG=12−pG
Assume the only cost of producing a beer is a constant marginal (and average) cost of $2.
If your bar had to charge a uniform price for beer, how much profit would the bar earn?
If you could price discriminate, how much profit would the bar earn?
By customer characteristics
Past purchase behavior
By location
Ideal competitive market, qc where pc=MC
A pure monopolist would produce less qm at higher pm
Transfer of some surplus from consumers to producers
A price-discriminating monopolist transfers MORE surplus from consumers to producers
But encourages monopolist to produce more than the pure monopoly level and reduce deadweight loss!
Price-discrimination creates incentives for innovation and risk-taking
Firms with high fixed costs of investment earn greater profits with price discrimination, can recover their fixed costs
Might not invest or produce if they had to charge a uniform price
As with markups in general, price discrimination has everything to do with price elasticity of demand
If you are paying too much and losing consumer surplus, the real “problem” is that your demand is not very elastic
If you want to pay less, buy generic (more elastic)
Realize that any “sales” and “discounts” are calculated to make the store more money
You can also be better off as a consumer too
Think about your consumer surplus!
If you were already planning to buy the product, a fall in price is a good deal for you
If you weren’t going to buy the product before, and now you do, the sale was effective for the store, and you likely don’t get much surplus
Price discrimination is selling identical goods to people at different prices
But not everytime people pay different prices means it is price discrimination
Sometimes it is truly different goods that people are paying different prices for
Example: bottled sparkling water often higher price than Coca Cola
Could be because sparkling water drinkers have less elastic demand than Coke drinkers
Or could be that it is more expensive to package sparkling water (economies of scale with greater number of Coke drinkers)
The best way to tell the difference is to see what happens if demand changes price elasticity (and costs do not change)
See today’s class notes for a graphical demonstration
If firm cannot identify customers' demands or types before purchase
Indirect or 2nd-degree price discrimination: firm offers difference price-quantity bundles and allows customers self-select (based on preferences)
Block Pricing/Nonlinear pricing: offer different prices for different quantities that consumers can choose
quantity discounting: higher quantities offered at lower prices
Example: instead of one profit-maximizing monopoly price of pm for qm units, offer:
Converts DWL into CS and captures more of it as Profit
Versioning: offer different prices for different qualities of a good (instead of quantity)
Must make versions incentive-compatible so that each type of consumer chooses version that matches their preferences
“It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a roof over the third-class carriage or to upholster the third-class seats that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches ... What the company is trying to do is prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from traveling third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich ... And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proved almost cruel to the third-class passengers and mean to the second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class customers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous.” — Jules Dupuit
Firms often tie multiple goods together, where you must buy both goods in order to consume the product
This is actually a method of intertemporal price-discrimination!
Companies often sell printers at marginal cost (no markup) and sell the ink/refills at a much higher markup
Reduce arbitrage:
High-volume users: buy more ink over time; pay more per sheet printed
Low-volume users: buy less ink; pay less per sheet printed
Again, a tradeoff:
Increased profits and reduced consumer surplus, reduced deadweight loss
Spreads fixed cost of research & development over more users
If printers & ink were not tied:
High-volume users would keep buying ink and save money (vs. tied)
Low-volume users might not buy the (now expensive) printer at all!
Firms often bundle products together as a single package, and refuse to offer individual parts of the package
Often, consumers do not want all products in the bundle
Or, if they were able to buy just part of the bundle, they would not buy the other parts
Example: Consider two consumers, each have different reservation prices to buy components in Microsoft Office bundle
Amy's WTP | Ben's WTP | |
---|---|---|
MS Word | $70 | $40 |
MS Excel | $50 | $60 |
Example: Consider two consumers, each have different reservation prices to buy components in Microsoft Office bundle
Amy's WTP | Ben's WTP | |
---|---|---|
MS Word | $70 | $40 |
MS Excel | $50 | $60 |
Microsoft could charge separate prices for MS Word and MS Excel
MS Word: both would buy at $40, generating $80 of revenues
Example: Consider two consumers, each have different reservation prices to buy components in Microsoft Office bundle
Amy's WTP | Ben's WTP | |
---|---|---|
MS Word | $70 | $40 |
MS Excel | $50 | $60 |
Microsoft could charge separate prices for MS Word and MS Excel
MS Word: both would buy at $40, generating $80 of revenues
MS Excel: both would buy at $50, generating $100 of revenues
Example: Consider two consumers, each have different reservation prices to buy components in Microsoft Office bundle
Amy's WTP | Ben's WTP | |
---|---|---|
MS Word | $70 | $40 |
MS Excel | $50 | $60 |
Microsoft could charge separate prices for MS Word and MS Excel
MS Word: both would buy at $40, generating $80 of revenues
MS Excel: both would buy at $50, generating $100 of revenues
Total revenues of individual sales: $180
Example: Consider two consumers, each have different reservation prices to buy components in Microsoft Office bundle
Amy's WTP | Ben's WTP | |
---|---|---|
MS Word | $70 | $40 |
MS Excel | $50 | $60 |
Bundle | $120 | $100 |
Microsoft could charge separate prices for MS Word and MS Excel
MS Word: both would buy at $40, generating $80 of revenues
MS Excel: both would buy at $50, generating $100 of revenues
Total revenues of individual sales: $180
Microsoft can instead add their individual reservation prices and bundle products together to force both consumers to buy both products
Bundle: both buy at $100, generating $200 revenue
Again, a tradeoff:
Increased profits and reduced consumer surplus, reduced deadweight loss
Spreads fixed cost of research & development over more users
Goods with high fixed costs and low marginal costs (software, TV, music) increase profits from bundling