class: title-slide # 1.8 — Factor Markets ## ECON 326 • Industrial Organization • Spring 2023 ### Ryan Safner<br> Associate Professor of Economics <br> <a href="mailto:safner@hood.edu"><i class="fa fa-paper-plane fa-fw"></i>safner@hood.edu</a> <br> <a href="https://github.com/ryansafner/ioS23"><i class="fa fa-github fa-fw"></i>ryansafner/ioS23</a><br> <a href="https://ioS23.classes.ryansafner.com"> <i class="fa fa-globe fa-fw"></i>ioS23.classes.ryansafner.com</a><br> --- class: inverse # Outline ### [Labor Supply Decisions](#12) ### [Labor Market for Competitive Firm](18) ### [Labor Market for a Monopoly](#33) ### [Monopsony Power](#37) ### [Monopoly Power in Labor Markets: Unions](#59) --- # Returning to Firms .pull-left[ - Recall a firm uses technology that buys inputs, transforms them, and sells output `$$q=f(k,l)$$` - We classified inputs into the .hi[factors of production]: land, labor, capital - We *assumed* fixed factor prices - show up in total cost `\(=wL+rK\)` - Where do they come from? .hi[Factor markets] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 70%](../images/inputoutput.png) ] ] --- # Circular Flow .center[ ![:scale 60%](../images/circularflow.png) ] --- # Firms’ Payments to Factors are Income To Households .quitesmall[ <table> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align:left;"> Income Type </th> <th style="text-align:right;"> Amount (2016) </th> <th style="text-align:right;"> Percent </th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="text-align:left;"> Salaries and wages </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> $7217 Bn </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> 68.45% </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align:left;"> Taxable pensions and annuities </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> $694 Bn </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> 6.58% </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align:left;"> Partnership and S corporation net income </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> $629 Bn </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> 5.97% </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align:left;"> Capital gains less losses </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> $621 Bn </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> 5.89% </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align:left;"> Business net income </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> $389 Bn </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> 3.69% </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align:left;"> Taxable Social Security benefits </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> $286 Bn </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> 2.71% </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align:left;"> Taxable IRA distributions </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> $258 Bn </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> 2.45% </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align:left;"> Ordinary dividends </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> $254 Bn </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> 2.41% </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align:left;"> Total rental and royalty net income </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> $98 Bn </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> 0.93% </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align:left;"> Taxable interest </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> $97 Bn </td> <td style="text-align:right;"> 0.92% </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> ] .source[Source: [Tax Foundation, 2018](https://taxfoundation.org/sources-of-personal-income-2016/)] --- # Firms’ Payments to Factors are Income To Households .pull-left[ .center[ ![](../images/Sources-of-Personal-Income-2016-Update-1.png) ] ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/FF612-chart-2.png) ] ] .source[Source: [Tax Foundation, 2018](https://taxfoundation.org/sources-of-personal-income-2016/)] --- # Supply and Demand in Factor Markets .pull-left[ - The price of a factor is governed by the same market forces as output: - .hi-red[Supply of Factor]: willingness of factor owners to accept and sell/rent their services to firms - landowners, workers, capitalists, resource owners, suppliers - .hi-blue[Demand for Factor]: willingness of firms to pay for/hire factor services ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-2-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Factor Market Prices and Opportunity Costs .pull-left[ - .hi[Factor price represents **opportunity cost** of hiring a factor for an alternative use] - Firms not only pay for direct use of a factor, but also indirectly for *not using* it in an alternate process! ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 100%](../images/disappear.jpg) ] ] --- # Factor Market Prices and Opportunity Costs .pull-left[ - .green[**Example**]: a producer of hammers buys steel, pays (the opportunity cost) for "taking" the steel away from alternative uses ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 100%](../images/disappear.jpg) ] ] --- # Factor Market Prices and Opportunity Costs .pull-left[ - .green[**Example**]: e.g. salary for a skilled worker must be high enough to keep them at their current firm, and not be attracted to other firms/industries ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 100%](../images/disappear.jpg) ] ] --- # Example Factor Market: Labor Markets .pull-left[ - Empirically, about 70% of total cost of production comes from labor - We’ll focus just on the .hi[market for labor] as an example factor market - Can do the same for *any* factor market - (e.g. capital, land, materials, etc.) ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/labormarket.jpg) ] ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # Labor Supply Decisions --- # Labor Supply Decisions .pull-left[ - The .red[Supply of Labor] comes from **individual decisions to work** - Labor is considered a .hi[disutility] (a .hi[bad]) - **Opportunity cost** of labor is .hi[leisure] - But, labor generates .hi-purple[income] for .hi-purple[consumption] (a good) - Tradeoff: if you work more, you get more income, but less leisure ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![:scale 50%](../images/labor2.png) ![:scale 50%](../images/freedom.jpg) ] ] --- # Modeling Labor Supply Decisions: A Change In Wages .pull-left[ - We often see “backward-bending” labor supply curves - Depends on whether income or substitution effect dominates ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-3-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # A Brief Digression on Economic Rents I .pull-left[ - Recall .hi-red[market supply] is the **minimum willingness to accept**, the minimum price necessary to bring a resource to market (its opportunity cost) - But all (equivalent) labor is paid the *market wage*, `\(w^*\)` determined by market labor supply and labor demand ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-4-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # A Brief Digression on Economic Rents II .pull-left[ - Some workers would have accepted a job for less than `\(w^*\)` - These inframarginal workers earn .hi[economic rent] in excess of what is needed to bring them into the market (their opportunity cost) ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-5-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # A Brief Digression on Economic Rents III .pull-left[ - Consider a factor (such as land) for which the supply is perfectly inelastic (e.g. a fixed supply) - Then the **entire value of the land is economic rent**! - .hi-purple[The *less* elastic the supply of a factor, the *more* economic rent it generates!] ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-6-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # Labor Market for a Competitive Firm --- # Derived Demand in Factor Markets .pull-left[ - Demand for factors is a .hi-purple[“derived demand”]: - Firm only demands inputs to the extent they **contribute to producing sellable output** - Firm faces a .hi-purple[tradeoff] when **hiring more labor**, as more labor `\(\Delta L\)` creates: 1. .hi[Marginal Benefit]: Increases output and thus revenue 2. .hi[Marginal Cost]: Increases costs ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/firms.png) ] ] --- # Marginal Revenue Product (of Labor) - Hiring more labor increases new output (i.e. labor's .hi-purple[`\\(MP_L\\)`]) - [Recall](https://ios23.classes.ryansafner.com/content/1.2-content/): `\(MP_L=\frac{\Delta q}{\Delta L}\)`, where `\(q\)` is units of output -- - Additional output generates new revenues (i.e. labor's .hi-purple[`\\(MR(q)\\)`]) - Recall: `\(MR(q)=\frac{\Delta R(q)}{\Delta q}\)`, where `\(R(q)\)` is total revenue -- - Hiring more labor, on the **margin**, generates a **benefit**, called the .hi-blue[marginal revenue product of labor, `\\(MRP_L\\)`]: `$$MRP_L=MP_L* MR(q)$$` - i.e. the number of new products a new worker makes times the revenue earned by selling the new products --- # Marginal Revenue Product for *Competitive* Firms .pull-left[ - This is the .hi-blue[Firm's Demand for Labor]: `$$MRP_L=MP_L* MR(q)$$` - For a firm in a .hi[competitive (output) market], firm's `\(MR(q)=p\)`, hence: `$$MRP_L=MP_L*p$$` where `\(p\)` is the price of the firm's *output* ] <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-7-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> --- # Marginal Revenue Product for *Competitive* Firms .pull-left[ `$$MRP_L=MP_L* p$$` - Marginal benefit of hiring labor, `\(MRP_L\)` **falls** with more labor used - production exhibits **diminishing marginal returns to labor**! - .hi[Choke price for labor demand]: price too high for firm to purchase any labor ] <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-8-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> --- # A Competitive *Factor* Market .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-9-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-10-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] - If the .hi[*factor* market is competitive], labor supply available to an individual firm is *perfectly elastic* at the market price of labor `\((w^*)\)` --- # Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor .pull-left[ - We've seen a falling `\(MRP_L\)`, the marginal benefit of hiring labor - .hi[Marginal cost of hiring labor], `\(w\)`, remains constant - so long as firm is not a big purchaser (has no market power) in the labor market ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-11-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor .pull-left[ - At low amounts of labor, .blue[marginal benefit] `\(\color{#0047AB}{MRP_L} > \color{#D7250E}{w}\)` .red[marginal cost] - Firm will hire more labor ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-12-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor .pull-left[ - At high amounts of labor, .blue[marginal benefit] `\(\color{#0047AB}{MRP_L} < \color{#D7250E}{w}\)` .red[marginal cost] - Firm will hire less labor ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-13-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor .pull-left[ - Firm hires `\(L^*\)` optimal amount of labor where `\(w=MRP_L\)` - i.e. .red[marginal cost] of labor `\(=\)` .blue[marginal benefit] of labor ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-14-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-15-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-16-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Labor Supply and Firm's Demand for Labor .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-17-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-18-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .smaller[ - If market supply of labor decreases (increases), wages increase (decrease) & firms hire fewer (more) workers ] --- # Example .bg-washed-green.b--dark-green.ba.bw2.br3.shadow-5.ph4.mt5[ .green[**Example**]: Victoria’s Tours is a travel company that offers guided tours of nearby mountain biking trails. Its marginal revenue product of labor is given by `$$MRP_L = 1,000 – 40L$$` where `\(L\)` is the number of tour-guide weeks it hires and `\(MRP_L\)` is measured in dollars per tour-guide week. The going market wage for tour guides is $600 per tour-guide week. ] 1. What is the optimal amount of labor for Victoria’s Tours to hire? 2. At and above what market wage would Victoria’s Tours not want to hire *any* labor? 3. What is the *most* labor Victoria’s Tours would ever hire, given its marginal revenue product? --- class: inverse, center, middle # Labor Demand for a Monopoly --- # Labor Demand for Competitive vs. Monopolist Firm .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-19-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - Recall a firm's demand for labor: `\(\color{blue}{MRP_L= MP_L * MR(q)}\)` - A firm in a **competitive _output_ industry** has its `\(MR(q)=p\)` - So we saw its .hi-blue[Labor Demand], `\(MRP_L = MP_L * p\)` ] --- # Labor Demand for Competitive vs. Monopolist Firm .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-20-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - Recall if firm is a **monopolist** in its **output** industry, its `\(MR(q) < p\)` - So its .hi-blue[Labor Demand], `\(MRP_L = MRP_L * MR(q)\)` - Since `\(MR(q) < p\)`, .hi-purple[a monopoly in its output industry will always have lower demand for labor], and thus, .hi-purple[hire less labor than a competitive firm] - Monopoly produces less output, so wants fewer inputs! ] --- # Labor Demand for Competitive vs. Monopolist Firm .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-21-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - This is about the competitiveness of the **output** or .hi-purple[“downstream”] market - Here, both competitive firm and monopolist in downstream markets face the same perfectly elastic .hi-red[labor supply] - We've assumed no market power in the **input** or .hi-purple[“upstream”] market (for labor) - We next consider market power in the upstream (labor) market... ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # Monopsony Power --- # Monopsony .pull-left[ - What if the firm has .hi-purple[market power in a factor market]? - Consider extreme example: .hi[monopsony]: a factor market with a **single buyer** ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/monopolyman.jpg) ] ] --- # Monopsony and Market Supply of Labor .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-22-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - Market power in *hiring* labor implies that the firm faces the **whole market factor supply curve** for labor - Market supply is upward sloping - .hi-red[Factor (inverse) supply] describes minimum price workers are willing to accept to work ] --- # Monopsony and Market Supply of Labor .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-23-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - As firm chooses to hire more `\(L\)`, must raise wages on *all* workers to hire them ] --- # Monopsony and Market Supply of Labor .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-24-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - As firm chooses to hire more `\(L\)`, must raise wages on *all* workers to hire them - .green[Output effect]: increased cost from increased number of workers ] --- # Monopsony and Market Supply of Labor .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-25-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - As firm chooses to hire more `\(L\)`, must raise wages on *all* workers to hire them - .green[Output effect]: increased cost from increased number of workers - .red[Price effect]: increased cost from raising wage for all workers ] --- # Monopsony and Marginal Cost of Labor I - If monopsonist wants to hire more labor, `\(\Delta L\)`, its labor cost `\(C(L)\)` would change by: .center[ `\(\Delta C(L)=\)`.green[`\\(w \Delta L\\)`] `\(+\)` .red[`\\(L \Delta w\\)`] ] -- - .green[Output effect]: increases number of labor hired `\((\Delta L)\)` times wage `\(w\)` per worker -- - .red[Price effect]: raises wage per worker `\((\Delta w)\)` on *all* workers hired `\((L)\)` -- - Divide both sides by `\(\Delta L\)` to get .hi-purple[Marginal Cost of Labor, `\\(MC(L)\\)`]: `$$\frac{\Delta C(L)}{\Delta L}=\color{#6A5ACD}{MC(L)=w+\frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L}L}$$` -- .small[ - Compare: supply for a **price-taking** firm is perfectly elastic: `\(\color{#6A5ACD}{\frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L}}=0\)`, so we saw `\(\color{#6A5ACD}{MC(L)=w}\)`! ] --- # Monopsony and Marginal Cost of Labor II .smallest[ - If we have a linear inverse supply function for labor of the form `$$\color{#e64173}{w=a+bL}$$` - `\(a\)` is the choke price (intercept) - `\(b\)` is the slope ] -- .smallest[ - Marginal cost of labor again is defined as: `$$MC(L)=w+\color{#44C1C4}{\frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L}}L$$` ] -- .smallest[ - Recognize that `\(\color{#44C1C4}{\frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L}}\)` is the slope, `\(b\)`, `\(\left(\frac{rise}{run} \right)\)` ] -- .smallest[ `$$\begin{align*} MC(L)&=w+(\color{#44C1C4}{b})L\\ MC(L)&=(\color{#e64173}{a+bL})+bL\\ \color{#6A5ACD}{MC(L)}&=\color{#6A5ACD}{a+2bL}\\ \end{align*}$$` ] --- # Monopsony and Marginal Cost of Labor IV .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-26-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ `$$\begin{align*} \color{#D7250E}{w(L)}&\color{#D7250E}{=a+bL}\\ \color{#8b1a1a}{MC(L)}&\color{#8b1a1a}{=a+2bL}\\ \end{align*}$$` - Marginal cost of labor starts at same intercept as Supply (average cost of labor) `\((a)\)` with twice the slope `\((2b)\)` .tiny[ Note: If these past few slides have sounded familiar, this is the [exact same process](/slides/1.5-slides#18) by which we derived a *monopolist*’s marginal *revenue* curve! ] ] --- # Monopsony's Hiring Decisions .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-27-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - Optimal quantity is where `\(MC=MR\)` - Firm's `\(MC(L)=MRP_L\)` ] --- # Monopsony's Hiring Decisions .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-28-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - Optimal quantity is where `\(MC=MR\)` - Firm's `\(MC(L)=MRP_L\)` - Monopsonist faces *entire* .hi-red[market supply] - Can lower wages as low as workers’ minimum WTA (Supply) ] --- # Monopsonist’s Hiring Decisions .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-29-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - Optimal quantity is where `\(MC=MR\)` - Firm's `\(MC(L)=MRP_L\)` - Monopsonist faces *entire* .hi-red[market supply] - Can lower wages as low as workers' minimum WTA (Supply) - Compared to a competitive labor market `\((L_c,w_c)\)`, .hi-purple[monopsonist hires fewer workers and pays them lower wages] `\((L_m,w_m)\)`; creates **deadweight loss** ] --- # Monopsony Example II .bg-washed-green.b--dark-green.ba.bw2.br3.shadow-5.ph4.mt5[ .smallest[ .green[**Example**]: Now suppose that Victoria’s Tours is the *only* travel company that offers guided tours in the broader region. Its marginal revenue product of labor over the whole region, is given by `$$MRP_L = 1,000 – 4L$$` where `\(L\)` is the number of tour-guide weeks it hires and `\(MRP_L\)` is measured in dollars per tour-guide week. The market (inverse) supply of local tour guide labor is equal to `$$w=200+4L$$` ] ] .smallest[ 1. If this market were competitive, what would the equilibrium number of workers and the market wage be? 2. As a monopsonist, how many workers will Victoria's Tours hire, and what will they pay them? ] --- # Monopsony Example II <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-30-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> --- # Monopsony Power Depends on Price Elasticity .center[ .smallest[ .hi-purple[The more (less) elastic labor *supply*, the less (more) monopsony power (and DWL)] ] ] .pull-left[ .center[ .smallest[ *Less* Elastic .red[Labor Supply Curve] ] ] <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-31-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ .center[ .smallest[ *More* Elastic .red[Labor Supply Curve] ] ] <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-32-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # Monopoly Power in Labor Markets: Unions --- # Monopoly Power in Labor Markets: Unions .pull-left[ <img src="1.8-slides_files/figure-html/unnamed-chunk-33-1.png" width="504" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ - If **seller**/s of labor (workers) has market power, can act like a **monopolist** on the labor market - .hi-green[Example]: A labor union - Faces entire market demand for labor, and thus its marginal revenue curve too - Acts like a monopolist, restricts `\(L_u < L_c\)` to push up `\(w_u > w_c\)` ] --- # The Problem of Bilateral Monopoly .pull-left[ - What if **both** sides of the market **have market power**? - A downstream .hi-blue[monopsonist buyer] vs. an upstream .hi-red[monopolist seller] - This is the problem of .hi[bilateral monopoly] - We’ll examine later this semester - One solution is .hi-purple[vertical integration]: merge into a single firm across both markets ] .pull-right[ .center[ ![](../images/negotiation.jpg) ] ]