5.3 — Antitrust II: The Paradox — Class Content
Overview
Today we continue our examination of antitrust law by looking at how antitrust theory and practice have dramatically changed since the 1970s, largely as a result of Robert Bork’s book The Antitrust Paradox, and the adoption of the “Consumer Welfare standard.”
We also turn to take a more critical look at the history of the U.S. in the Progressive Era to address three questions: 1. Why were most economists against (or at least, not in favor of) the Sherman Act? 2. Did the industries accused of forming “trusts” and monopolies actually behave like monopolies? 3. What was the original intent and purpose of the Sherman Act?
Readings
Recommended Readings:
Crandall and Winston, 2003, “Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence”
Kovacic and Shapiro, 2000, “Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking”
DiLorenzo, 1985, “The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective”
DiLorenzo and High, 1988, “Antitrust and Competition, Historically Considered”
McGee, 1958, “Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case”
Demsetz, 1973, “Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy”
Bork, 1966, “Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act”
Hazlett, 1992, “The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-Examined”
Williamson, 1968, “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs”
Slides
Below, you can find the slides in two formats. Clicking the image will bring you to the html version of the slides in a new tab. The lower button will allow you to download a PDF version of the slides.
You can type h to see a special list of viewing options, and type o for an outline view of all the slides.
I suggest printing the slides beforehand and using them to take additional notes in class (not everything is in the slides)!
